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UNEQUAL PROTECTION: POVERTY AND FAMILY LAW
HENRY H. FOSTER, JR.t
DORIS JONAS FREEDf
The 1960's may be memorable, historically, as the decade which
shook up the professions. Whether they liked it or not, doctors were
confronted with medicare; lawyers with legal aid to the indigent;
teachers were challenged by activist students and parents; and the clergy
had faith and dogma tested by the ecumenical movement and the slogan
that God is dead. Professional autonomy in each instance was threatened
by the presumption that the particular profession was a "business af-
fected with a public interest," a quaint concept which otherwise had been
relegated to constitutional limbo.'
Although the claim has been made that professional autonomy for
decision and policy-making is a fundamental freedom in a democratic
society,2 it is obvious that what Edmond Calm called the "consumer's per-
spective"' is making considerable headway. The imperatives, if not the
needs, of patient, client, student, and parishioner, must be served or else
competing institutions will appear or governmental regulation will be
applied. Courts, legislatures, and executives are becoming more respon-
sive to the legitimate demands of pressure groups, and the power of the
establishment is being threatened with dilution and redistribution. It
seems to be a safe prediction that what has come to be known as "power,"
before the 1970's, will be diffused among diverse groups and segments of
the population and that its over-concentration in the white Protestant por-
tion of the community will become a thing of the past.
This trend toward viewing professional services from the point of
view of individual and social needs, rather than from the practitioner's
viewpoint, is most apparent in the case of the legal profession. The so-
t Professor of Law, New York University.
t Member of the New York and Maryland bars.
1. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
2. See essay by Alfred North Whitehead in FREEDOM: ITS MEANING (Anshen ed.
1946). See also Foster, The Relation and Correlation of Freedom and Security, 58 W.
VA. L. REv. 325 (1956).
3. See CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF MODERN MAN (1961). Senator Robert F.
Kennedy has said that "the poor man looks upon law as an enemy. . . For him the
law is always taking things away." Quoted in WALD, LAW AND POVERTY 6 n.13 (1965).
4. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 516, 42 U.S.C. § 2782(a) (3)
(1964), requires the "maximum feasible participation of the poor" in the programs fi-
nanced by the federal government. However, governors are given a veto power over all
OEO programs in their states.
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called War Against Poverty, recent Supreme Court decisions,' and the
civil rights movement, have combined to force a critical examination of
the status quo and the institutional capacity of the legal profession to
adapt to changing needs. Gideon's trumpet may not have blasted down
the walls of Jericho, but the message has come through loud and clear that
there is a public and professional responsibility to provide legal services
to the poor.' In this analysis, however, we shall limit our inquiry to
poverty and family law and shall examine but a few instances where eco-
nomic factors, properly or improperly, help determine the processing of
family problems. More specifically, we shall attempt to see how poverty
relates to the law of marriage and divorce, alimony and support, custody,
adoption, and juvenile court procedures. These areas will be explored
in general since it is sufficient for present purposes to show that there
exists some inequality and operational discrimination based upon finan-
cial status. For an in-depth study of the family law of the poor and that
other family law for the more fortunate, the reader is referred to the ex-
cellent work of Professor Jacobus tenBroek and the California sympo-
sium on "Law of the Poor."8
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND POVERTY
To an appreciable extent the law of marriage and divorce has priced
itself out of the market. The financial obligations incurred as an inci-
5. Including: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1955).
6. See U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL
SERVICES To THE POOR (1964); Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Per-
spective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964) ; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) ;
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issices, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965) ; Symposium, Justice and the Poor, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 843 (1966). See
also Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides "every-
one, as a member of society has the right to social security and is entitled to realiza-
tion . . . of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality." Concern about legal services for the poor is
not new although effective implementation is a recent development. In 1919 Reginald
Heber Smith's J stice and the Poor was published. The Legal Aid movement is ninety
years old and by 1965 there were more than 150 major cities with legal aid agencies, an-
other 215 communities with voluntary legal services of one kind or another, and some
162 defender services for indigents accused of crime. However, Mr. Justice Fortas has
estimated that such traditional legal services meet only about 10 per cent of the need
for such services. The services currently being provided fall into the four major areas
of landlord-tenant law, domestic relations, welfare law, and debtor-creditor. See Voor-
hees, The OEO Legal Services Program: Should the Bar Support It?, 53 A.B.A.J. 23
(1967). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 381 (1965).
7. tenBroek, California's Duel System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 900 (1964) (pts. 1-2), 17 STAN. L. REv. 614
(1965) (pt. 3).
8. 54 CALIF. L. REv. 319-1014 (1966).
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dent to marriage may make it a luxury that the poor cannot afford and
desertion may become the practical way to escape from either a putative
or legal marital relationship. In England, before the Matrimonial Causes
Act of 1857, desertion was the common mode of terminating an unsatis-
factory relationship; dissenting sects and various groups had their own
extra-legal customs, and parliamentary divorce was available only to the
extremely wealthy.9 Even annulment or a mensa et thoro divorce, the
alternatives available in the ecclesiastical courts, were too costly for the
average Englishman.1" Thus, of necessity, all but the wealthy were
forced to resort to some form of self-help when a marital situation be-
came intolerable.
In this country, too, among some sub-cultures, custom rather than
law traditionally has governed the creation and termination of informal
marital relationships. 1 Informal terminations of marriages are not un-
common for those informally entered into, and in the fifteen states re-
taining the institution of common law marriage there may be difficult
factual questions due to the uncertainty of the distinction between legal
and putative common law marriage. To the parties involved, "common
law marriage" may mean either an at will liaison of uncertain duration,
or a private contract of marriage, and especially among the poor, "com-
mon law divorce" may be resorted to in either event. There is the super-
stition in some parts of the country that if a spouse has been absent for
five or seven years, the deserted party automatically is entitled to re-
marry, and there are instances of "law office divorce" where the parties
assume that once a divorce complaint has been filed they are free to re-
marry and that the decree is a mere technicality. 2
There is a grave danger that something comparable to concubinage
may develop in this country due to the financial obligations incurred by
marriage and the expense of divorce. In many Latin American countries
the children of concubines constitute over 50 percent of all live births. 3
Although the Roman Catholic hierarchy has disapproved of concubinage,
unrealistic dogma and poverty have combined to make concubinage a so-
cially acceptable institution for the impoverished masses. Unrealistic
9. See Mueller, Inquiry Into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PiTT. L. REv.
545 (1957).
10. Ibid.
11. See Foster, Common Law Divorce, 46 MINN. L. REv. 43 (1961).
12. Ibid.
13. See Arraros, Concubinage in. Latin Anerica, 3 J. FAMILY LAw 330 (1964),
who reports the illegitimacy rate of all live births in 1958 in Panama was 73.9% and in
Guatemala 71.6%. The Antilles, Honduras, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nica-
ragua, and Venezuela, all reported over 50 per cent. Most of the illegitimate children
resulted from concubinage, although some were produced by casual meretricious relation-
ships.
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divorce laws and poverty in the United States likewise may combine to
produce extra-legal relationships and a high rate of illegitimacy.1
When one considers that one-fourth to one-third of the American
population is afflicted with a combination of low income, low educational
attainment, and substandard housing, the inevitability of irregular rela-
tionships and illegitimacy becomes apparent. Almost one-third of Amer-
ican families in 1959 had an annual income of less than $4,000; almost
40 million persons twenty-five years old and over in 1960 had no more
than an eighth grade education; and in the same year over a quarter of
all housing units in the United States were classified as deteriorated,
dilapidated, or lacking in plumbing facilities. 5 Income, education, and
housing together with other factors such as age and religious affiliation,
are all related to customs regarding marriage and divorce. Actually,
socio-economic factors have much more to do with family stability and
instability than do the usual symptoms set forth as grounds for divorce.
Sociologists have found that there is a rough inverse correlation be-
tween class position and rate of divorce. Those classified as professional,
semi-professional, and proprietors are the least divorce prone, while la-
borers, service workers, and the unskilled or semi-skilled have the highest
incidence of divorce.'6 Moreover, the greatest degree of divorce prone-
ness is among the lower income groups.'" The factors of location and
mobility are, however, connected to low income and menial work. More-
over, among the very poor, the expense puts divorce out of the question.
It also has been noted that conclusions from such studies may not be ap-
plicable to the Negro population which shows no comparable decrease in
the incidence of divorce with increased income and educatioal achieve-
ment.'"
General economic conditions also affect the overall rate of divorce,
and it has been said that the incidence of marriage and the incidence of
divorce follow the business cycle.'9 The marriage and divorce rates are
relatively low in depression years and correspondingly high during years
of prosperity. It should not be assumed, however, that economic adver-
sity necessarily draws families closer together, for after the worst of the
depression period is passed, there usually is a rapid rise in the divorce
14. See 1966 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family
Laws to the Legislature of the State of New York 63-64 (dated March 31, 1966).
15. Buzu OF CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COmmERcE, STATISTIcAl. ARSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 117, 333, 759 (83d ed. 1962).
16. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 52-53 (1956).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 54. See also Monahan, Educational Achievement and Family Stability,
55 J. SocIAl. PSYCHOLOGY 253, 257 (1961).
19. JACOBSON, AzERICAN MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE 95 (1959).
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rate.2" It is likely that embittered and estranged couples merely bide their
time until they can afford divorce.
With reference to educational achievement and family breakdown,
in general there appears to be a correlation between degree of education
and marriage stability. However, it is difficult to isolate the educational
factor from other ones such as occupation, income, housing, social back-
ground, and age.2' One study reports that "not only are grammar-school
educated persons more likely to divorce (at twice the rate of those of col-
lege education) but that they divorce on the average nine years earlier
than do college people who divorce."22  Another study, however, showed
that by educational level "divorcees" divided into 10 percent for the
grade school group, 71 percent for the high school class, and 19 percent
for the college grade.2 From these studies, and others, it has been con-
cluded that "to some extent as regards divorce, family stability may be
associated with higher educational accomplishment at the college level, but
not at the high school level."2 4  In the case of Negroes, the divorce rate
appears to remain approximately the same without reference to the
amount of formal education.2"
Housing conditions obviously have a great impact upon both mar-
riage and divorce. The availability of and means to pay for suitable liv-
ing accommodations often are major factors in determining when couples
will marry. Substandard housing or lack of separate living accommoda-
tions are important elements in family breakdown.26 The current pro-
grams for slum clearance, public housing, and relocation have as one ob-
jective the provision of better housing to increase family stability.
The inter-relation between poverty and family instability may be
approached from another angle. Professor tenBroek cites a 1962 Cali-
fornia study 7 of some 86,000 AFDC families (aid to families with de-
pendent children program) which disclosed that of that number 77,000
20. Ibid.
21. GOODE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 40.
22. Monahan, supra note 18, at 255.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 261.
25. Id. at 257. See also GOODE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 54, where he says that
among Negroes, with increasing education, there appears to be an increasing proneness
to divorce. However, it should be noted that Negroes may marry at an earlier age and
that the psychological pressures on middle-class Negroes are greater than those on most
middle-class white couples.
26. See GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 412-13 (1965); Berman
v. Berman, 277 App. Div. 560, 101 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1950). See also Kubie, The Disinte-
grating Impact of "Modern Life" on the Family in America and its Explosive Repercus-
siobs, printed in LIEBMAN, EMOTIONAL FORCES IN THE FAMILY 140-43 (1959).
27. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 618. The AFDC (Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children) program is provided for in 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-09 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-06 (Supp. I, 1965).
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were cases where the father was absent from the home. In 9,000 of
those cases the fathers were absent because they were deceased, im-
prisoned, or had been deported or excluded, and in the remaining 68,355
cases they were "voluntarily absent." In the latter category of "volun-
tarily absent" fathers there were some 18,429 who were separated by
divorce, annulment, or judicial separation; 10,473 who had separated
without court decree; 5,647 cases of illegal desertion; 25,721 cases where
the couples were never marfied and never lived together; and, 8,085
cases where they had never married but lived togther. The same study
also reported that of the 249,000 children in California who in 1962 re-
ceived AFDC, 37.2 percent were born to parents who never were mar-
ried to each other. Insofar as compliance with marriage and divorce law
is concerned, 49,000 of the 77,000 absent father cases were ones where
there never had been a legal marriage, or there was desertion or separa-
tion without a court decree.
The California study also made a breakdown by ethnic background
for the percentage of "voluntarily absent" fathers, i.e., those not deceased,
imprisoned, or deported, as compared with the total receiving AFDC.
It was found that 68 percent of the white fathers were voluntarily absent
from the home, 71 percent of the Mexican fathers, and 89 percent of the
Negro fathers. In addition, half of the white fathers who were estranged
were divorced or legally separated, as compared with 19.1 percent of the
Mexican fathers, and 14.3 percent of the Negro fathers. While only 25.1
percent of the white fathers had never been married to the mother, 57.4
percent of the Mexican fathers and 62.3 percent of the Negro fathers
had never been married to the mothers.28
Although the California report, and other studies such as the Moyni-
han Report, are significant in disclosing the extent to which ethnic back-
ground is related to family patterns, poverty is much more widespread
among Mexicans and Negroes, and their opportunity for economic ad-
vancement has been rare.29 It appears that a combination of economic,
historical, and cultural reasons account for the relative frequency of re-
sort to custom instead of law on the part of some ethnic groups. When
free legal aid services are made available to the poor, experience shows
that they will resort to the legal processes, and in the case of divorce, the
recent report from the "judicare" program in twenty-six rural counties
28. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 619.
29. See Miller, Race, Poverty, and the Law, 54 CALIf. L. REv. 386 (1966). Negro
unemployment hovers around two to three times that of white workmen and that which
is described as "employment" for Negroes is all too often marginal work that requires
supplemental aid or assistance. Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard Uni-
versity, June 4, 1965. See also YouNG, To BE EQuA1 ch. 3 (1964).
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in Wisconsin shows that the greatest demand for legal services on the
part of indigents is in regard to family problems.3" In its first six weeks
of operation, 84 percent of the cases were requests for divorce. Of
eighty-six cases, sixty-three were for divorce, and nine were custody and
support actions. This startling experience had its counterpart in England
where in 1950, when legal services were provided for the poor, 80 percent
of the cases first reported were for divorce, although the percentage sub-
sequently leveled off at about 40 percent.3 '
In New York City, the experience of the Mobilization for Youth
project has been that the poor, if they ever consult lawyers, tend to delay
until they are confronted with a crisis. Domestic relations cases and
claims for support predominate "because the lower the average income
the higher the rate of broken families."" Before the advent of the pov-
erty program, however, legal aid services in the vast majority of cities
having legal aid were not provided for divorce or annulment cases, al-
though in some instances non-support cases were handled by legal aid.
Regardless of the motivations or rationale behind the policy decision not
to provide legal aid for divorce cases, the practical consequence inevitably
was to force the poor to by-pass law and to perpetuate "common law"
marriage and "common law" divorce.
Law in operation may be discriminatory not only when like things
are treated differently but also when different things are treated the
same, and it also is true that legislative inaction may constitute a taking
of sides. The latter situation is illustrated by Mr. Justice Stone's famous
decision in liller v. Schoene," where Virginia had to choose between
cedar trees and apple trees. If free legal aid services are not provided to
the indigent for matrimonial relief, the effect of the policy decision is
to force the poor to live outside the ambit of regular family law. The
irony of one law for the rich and the poor was commented upon by Jus-
tice Maule at the Warwick Spring Assizes in 1845. In Regina v. Hall,34
it appeared that Hall's first wife had turned out to be wantonly promis-
cuous, whereupon he left her. Later Hall met Maria, told her he was a
bachelor, and soon they were married. When Hall was prosecuted, Jus-
30. Graham, Judicare-Or How to Get a Free Divorce, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966,
§ 4, p. 6, cols. 5-7. For a recent discussion of legal aid and "judicare" for the poor, see
Voorhees, supra note 6.
31. Ibid.
32. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1966, p. 39, cols. 3-4.
33. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
34. This case, which is not in the official reports, is discussed in POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COmmoN LAW 211-12 (1921). The judge's remarks about one law for
the rich and the poor recalls the statement attributed to Anatole France that French
laws were fair because they forbade both rich and poor men from sleeping under bridges
on rainy nights.
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tice Maule expressed regret that he had to pronounce sentence and
pointed out that Hall should have gone to the courts to obtain (1) dam-
ages in an action for criminal conversation against one of his wife's
paramours, then (2) a divorce a mensa et thoro from the ecclesiastical
court, and finally (3) a bill of divorcement from Parliament, all at a cost
of over £1,000. Poor Hall's weekly wage was hardly in excess of £1.
Regina v. Hall is a landmark case in the history of English divorce
law because it was highly. publicized and created widespread indignation
which eventually found expression in the Matrimonial Causes Act of
1857. The modem sequel of Regina v. Hall is the recent New York de-
cision in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,3 which extended comity to bilateral
Mexican divorces and thus guaranteed a safe escape hatch for those
peregrinating New Yorkers who could afford a round trip ticket to El
Paso, cross the border to Juarez, visit a lawyer's office, and within a
matter of hours be on the return flight to New York. Thus, the two
essentials for severing the bonds of acrimony, insofar as New York was
concerned, were enough money to cover plane fare for one and legal fees
for two, and agreement by both that divorce was the way out of holy
deadlock. The latter was essential because the absentee spouse had to
execute a power of attorney authorizing the appearance of Mexican coun-
sel, otherwise the divorce would not be "bilateral" unless both flew to
Mexico and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Of course, under
the New York divorce law that had remained substantially unchanged
since Alexander Hamilton obtained its enactment in 1787, there also was
the possibility that divorce could be obtained in New York on the real or
trumped-up ground of adultery, or that an annulment on the ground of
fraud could be made out.3" If uncontested, such matrimonial relief was
less expensive than the added cost of a Mexican or sister state junket, al-
though it would take longer. Attorney fees, even for an uncontested
case, however, are beyond the means of the poor, the minimum fee in
New York City running between $350 and $500 for uncontested cases,
with some lawyers charging eight weeks pay."
Although minimum legal fees in New York City may be the highest
in the nation, divorce is an expensive proposition everywhere. The un-
employed worker in Pittsburgh or Los Angeles may not be able to afford
a somewhat smaller minimum fee for divorce. The economic factor in
some cases may be more significant than the substantive or procedural
35. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 709 (Ct. App. 1965).
36. See BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO ch. 13 (1962), which contains an excellent dis-
cussion of the fraud, perjury, and collusion indigenous to New York divorce law.
37. For an excellent discussion of the matrimonial bar, see O'GoRMAN, LAWYERS
AND MATRIMONIAL CASES (1963).
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law of divorce because, although divorce theoretically is readily obtain-
able, few can afford it. 8 In the Soviet Union, according to one re-
port, 9 the cost is prohibitive for a contested divorce, and a sociologist
reports the inhibitory effect among primitive people where the bride
price must be returned if a marriage is terminated."
It may be argued that economic compulsion to remain married and
the expense of divorce serve the socially desirable purpose of promoting
family stability. In our society, however, such rarely is the case. In real
life, the parties become estranged, and when able to do so form new in-
formal family relationships. Poverty usually promotes extra-legal action
rather than a resignation to and endurance of an intolerable situation.
The poor resort to desertion and propagate illegitimate children in large
measure because law has priced itself out of the market. The law itself
is not discriminatory, but in operation it produces discrimination because
historically the indigent cannot afford the luxury of formal justice.
ALIMONY, SUPPORT, AND POVERTY
Professor tenBroek in his discussion and analysis of the origin, de-
-velopment, and present status of a "dual system" of family law, sum-
marizes the differences between the two systems as follows:
One is public, the other private. One deals with expenditure and
conservation of public funds and is heavily political and measur-
ably penal. The other deals with the distribution of family
funds, focuses on the rights and responsibilities of family mem-
bers, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal. One is for under-
privileged and deprived families; the other for the more com-
fortable and fortunate.4
1
The historical origins of public assistance and the husband's duty to
support his family are traced to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, whereas
matrimonial property law and alimony are derived from the common law
and statute. Professor tenBroek's conclusion that these separate systems
are "inherently unequal" and that poverty is always an .arbitrary criterion
for governmental classification that poses an issue under the equal pro-
38. See Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REV. 239(1963).
39. Juviler, Marriage and Divorce in the USSR, 48 SuavEY 104, 107 (1963), says
"The total minimum cost for divorce in Moscow, then, is 100 rubles, not counting law-
yers' fees. If publication is in a provincial paper and costs less, say 10 rubles, then the
minimum cost is 70 rubles."
40. See 1 HowARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIO NS 247-48 (5th ed.
1925).
41. tenBroek (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 257-58.
200
UNEQUAL PROTECTION
tection clause, has been challenged."2 In fact it has been said in rebuttal
that "indigence is not yet the source of a right to demand benefits, sup-
ported by a correlative governmental duty to provide them. But no one
can doubt that government may choose to create certain benefits and
make them available only to the indigent; too much governmental action
is based on the essentially unchallenged assumption that it may."43
Although at this moment the above criticism of a portion of
tenBroek's thesis may be technically correct, it is by no means certain that
a whole new set of premises are not being formulated in the welfare
field. Socialization of the law has been accelerated during the past de-
cade. There is emerging authority to the effect that welfare recipients
have legal as well as moral rights and that government has a moral if
not legal duty to provide for destitute families, without arbitrary and
unreasonable limitations and conditions.4" It is a safe prediction that as
legal services are provided for the poor, what formerly were regarded as
"benefits" will be transformed into "rights" that receive direct and in-
direct legal recognition. In a society where automation, discrimination,
and lack of opportunity, impose dire economic consequences on the vic-
tims and rejects of our industrial age, lawyers should not have too much
trouble in convincing courts that clients' welfare is public welfare. More-
over, judges habitually condemn capriciousness wherever they find it
and are apt to be impatient with arbitrary rules and regulations which
may serve the whims or convenience of administrators at the expense
of those whom they are supposed to serve." Judicial review of a bad
social work philosophy and administrative injustice presumably will draw
upon the familiar tenets of procedural due process.
However, although we agree with some if not most of the implica-
tions of tenlroek's thesis, it does not follow that welfare law and the law
of support on the one hand, and matrimonial property law and alimony
42. Lewis & Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies-The Case for "Dual Sys-
tents," 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 751 (1966). See also the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Jackson in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941), where he said "a man's
mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit
his rights as a citizen of the United States. 'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of
rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral
fact--constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color."
43. Lewis & Levy, supra note 42, at 754. See also Weyrauch, Dual Systems of Fam-
ily Law: A Comment, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 781 (1966), where the author attempts to recon-
cile the disagreement of his colleagues on the basis that tenBroek makes an historical
analysis and empirical approach whereas Lewis and Levy make an analytical approach.
44. See Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407(1966); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits and Strings Attached, 54
CALIF. L. Ray. 443 (1966) ; Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Admin-
istration, 54 CAI.nI. L. REV. 479 (1966).
45. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
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on the other, should be administered on the same basis. In fact, the dual
system probably should be retained, but, in each case, altered so as to bet-
ter accomplish different economic and social objectives. Welfare law,
as tenBroek points out, should accept and implement the philosophy de-
rived from the Poor Laws that the public has the responsibility to aid the
indigent and handicapped, but it should discard the penny-pinching "con-
servation of public funds" emphasis and "man in the home" nonsense
where such frustrates basic welfare objectives and demeans human be-
ings. We no longer need tolerate throwbacks to the time when paupers
had to wear a large letter "P" on their right sleeve and the pre-social se-
curity days when relief was limited to deserving widows and orphans of
good moral character.4" It would be naive, however, to expect the public
and legislators to disregard the cost of welfare programs or to relegate
the factor of public expense to relative insignificance.
What may happen, of course, is that Congress eventually will over-
haul social security and welfare laws and substitute some scheme, such as
a negative income tax or guaranteed annual income, to bring all families
up to a minimum standard of living. In any case, because poverty is so
widespread in our affluent society and spawns so many social ills, sub-
stantial changes in welfare laws are inevitable. These changes will result
from humanitarian considerations and the need to conserve human re-
sources and, ultimately, from the necessity of self-preservation. In time,
self-interest if not logic will compel our politicians to perceive the causal
connection between poverty, riots, and other threats to the established
order. The alms-giving or charity approach already is pass6 and no
longer has vifality in the public sector. A welfare system that merely
averts starvation for those who conform to the system is no longer ac-
ceptable in the revolutionary sixties.
But perhaps we should be more specific. How does the dual system
perceived by tenBroek work out in practice? He points out that the fam-
ily law of the poor reflects a different conception of marital rights and
duties relating to property and support. Husband and wife are not seen
as semi-independent partners, standing in a contractual relationship to
each other, but as having a single, undivided, and unseparated interest in
a common pool of family resources derived from the income of both
spouses. The family law of the poor places greater emphasis upon the
community, less upon the individuals; greater emphasis upon meeting
the needs of both spouses for support, less upon individual rights to sepa-
46. See the Pennsylvania Poor Law Amendment Act of 1718, 3 Pa. Stat. at Large
1712-1724, at 221 (1896), and the Indiana Poor Law of 1807, Ind. Acts 1807, ch. 22, § 3,
under which a pauper could be farmed out to the highest bidder, cited in RIESENFELD &
MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 709 (1950).
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rate property and income. Only after family resources are depleted may
public assistance be obtained. All of this, according to tenBroek, flows
from the traditional policy of minimizing the public cost of supporting
the poor and first tapping whatever family resources are available."
It is true that initially, under the Poor Laws, the husband's obliga-
tion to support his family was imposed by the temporal courts in order to
reimburse the parish for its expenditures in maintaining his family. The
common law action by creditors for necessaries was the only other sanc-
tion recognized. " The ecclesiastical courts, however, also recognized a
husband's moral obligation to support his family and applied their own
sanctions to compel him to do so. It also should be remembered that the
duty to support and the sanctions for its enforcement were developed at
a time when the husband was lord and master and upon marriage ac-
quired the wife's personalty, except her paraphernalia, and took over the
management of her realty, pocketing the rents and profits therefrom.
This vestige of feudalism, although mitigated for the wealthy by trustee
devices recognized in chancery, had profound consequences under the
common law, and despite Married Women's Property Acts, traces of it
persist to this day. For purposes of the present discussion, however, the
important thing is that although reimbursement of the parish may have
been the original basis for the husband's duty to support his family, in
time his duty to support came to be regarded as reciprocal to his control,
management, and ownership of matrimonial property. Such was true,
with qualifications, with reference to both his duty to support and his
duty to pay alimony in the event of a divorce a mensa et thoro. Perhaps
there was no early common law sanction closely resembling those imposed
under modern support and welfare laws because the ecclesiastical courts
claimed jurisdiction over such marital offenses as desertion and non-
support, and there was no temporal interest perceived until parish ex-
penditures under the Poor Laws led naturally to a demand for reimburse-
ment instead of the ecclesiastical sanction of penance.
Insofar as the Poor Laws and welfare legislation treat husband and
wife as partners and as having a single, undivided, and unseparated inter-
est in a common pool of family resources, it may be argued that this sys-
tem better reflects contemporary social and individual values. The com-
47. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 624.
48. Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties, 9 VAND. L. REV. 709 (1956). It has been
suggested that the duty of support flows from the wife's common law position as a near-
chattel. Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REV. 28 (1935). It also has been claimed
that the duty is founded on feudal principles. A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to
Support and Wife's Duty to Render Services, 29 VA. L. REv. 857 (1943). Actually,
however, the true basis for the duty is that it is a fair return for the ownership and
control over her property which he obtains by marriage.
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munity property regime may be more in accord with the expectations and
roles of modern middle class Americans who tend to view marriage as a
partnership enterprise with a division of labor and as entailing mutual
obligations and privileges.49 In practice, the matrimonial property law of
a majority of states tends to favor the husband at the expense of the
wife, although such undue preference may be compensated for in the
rules pertaining to alimony.5" It might be socially desirable to place ali-
mony on a more realistic basis by which actual need and ability to pay are
the paramount considerations (and the award may be to either spouse),"'
but also to adopt the community property concept for the distribution of
property upon divorce and annulment.5 2 The current utilization of ali-
mony to compensate for the inequity occasioned by obsolete matrimonial
property laws causes a great deal of difficulty and confusion, whereas if
the termination of a marriage were viewed as the dissolution of a partner-
ship, contemporary notions of the economic nature of the marriage rela-
tionship would be better served.
It may be persuasively argued that the economics of family law in
most states illustrate two wrongs trying to make it right. The wife ordi-
narily is at a disadvantage insofar as distribution or partitioning of prop-
erty is concerned; the husband frequently is victimized by the law of sup-
port and alimony. Because of Married Women's Property Acts, there
no longer is a reciprocal basis for the husband's support and alimony
obligation. The notion that such duties persist without regard to the
means or earning potential of the wife is difficult to justify in an era
when employment opportunities for women may be equal to or exceed
those for men.53
Another difference between support obligations under welfare laws
and those imposed by other laws is the effect given to marital fault.
Fault may be relatively insignificant under welfare laws, and a wronged
spouse may be required to pay minimal support to a wrongdoer.54 Al-
49. See Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 255 (1939) ; Comment, Contemporary Alimony, 38 NEB. L. REV. 782,
790-91 (1959).
50. See Dean, Economic Relations Between Husband and Wife in New York, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 188 (1956).
51. Eighteen states, under some circumstances, permit alimony to be awarded to
husbands. See PLOSCOWE & FREED, FAMILY LAW 284 (1963).
52. For a partnership approach to the distribution of property upon annulment, see
Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942).
53. See Rheinstein, supra note 38, at 239. See also statistics cited in FOSTER &
FREED, 2 LAW AND THE FAMILY xiii (1966).
54. In New York, under § 101 of the Social Welfare Law, if a designated relative
is of "sufficient ability" he will be relieved of the support obligation only under the most
extreme circumstances. For example, in In re Garrison, 171 Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Columbia County Ct. 1939), it was held that the wife had no duty to support a needy
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though such a policy may have been motivated by the desire to decrease
assistance costs, it makes good sense to stress actual need and ability to
pay, since such issues are easier to resolve than the elusive problem of
marital fault. In the case of alimony, and to some extent in non-support
cases, fault becomes a crucial issue and a red herring that impairs eco-
nomic justice. Moreover, fault need not be given such effect, for even
under parliamentary divorce the guilty wife got a "compassionate
allowance."
In addition to the greater emphasis on fault in divorce law, there
also are differences as to the criteria employed for determining what the
extent of the obligation is, who the obligors are, and which courts process
the case. The so-called "means test," that is, whether a person has suf-
ficient means and falls within a designated family relationship, controls
the support obligation under welfare legislation. "  In the case of ali-
mony, the commonly accepted standard is that the wife, where possible, is
to be awarded a sum that will enable her to live in the style and manner
she enjoyed during covertureY In most states alimony is awarded only
to a wife or former wife, whereas under welfare legislation a wife of
sufficient means may be ordered to contribute minimal support for a
destitute husband. Some welfare laws also compel either or both parents
to contribute to the support or maintenance of adult children who other-
wise may become public charges, or compel children to contribute to the
support of destitute parents." The legal obligation also may be extended
to step-parents and may run between grandparents and grandchildren. In
states such as New York, a different court processes support cases; di-
vorce cases are handled by a higher court in the judicial hierarchy. The
husband who had abandoned her for twenty-three years, and in Houg v. Houg, 159 Misc.
894, 289 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936), that a husband need not support a wife
who had committed bigamy and had engaged in prostitution. However, even these ex-
treme cases involved judicial construction for § 101 does not provide for an exemption
if the relative has "sufficient ability."
55. For example, see the New York Family Court Act § 412: "A husband is charge-
able with the support of his wife and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn
such means, may be required to pay for her support a fair and reasonable sum, as the
court may determine, having due regard to the circumstances of the respective parties."
See also tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
809, 822 (1966).
56. The leading recent case on factors to be considered in awarding alimony is
McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). For an excellent study
and critique, see Hopson, Economics of a Divorce: A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial
Court Level, 11 K.AN. L. REv. 107 (1962).
57. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 645-46, criticizes saddling relatives with re-
sponsibility and cites welfare authorities to the same effect. He says that "liability of
relatives creates and increases family dissension and controversy, weakens and destroys
family ties at the very time and in the very circumstances when they are most needed,
imposes an undue burden on the poor . . . and is therefore socially undesirable, finan-
cially unproductive, and administratively unfeasible."
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clientele, procedure, and courtroom atmosphere is substantially different
in the two courts, the support court ordinarily serving a lower socio-
economic strata than the divorce court. Typically, in metropolitan sup-
port courts, irate wives queue up for the "instant justice" that is forced
down the throats of embittered husbands.
In the case of the very poor, contact with family law, when it does
occur, usually is made in support court, where the "means test" is em-
ployed and the question of marital fault may not be relevant, and where
the primary purpose is to tap a possible source of funds before the desti-
tute relative is entitled to public assistance. Although this primary pur-
pose for invoking the jurisdiction of the support court is properly chal-
lenged by tenBroek and defended by others, both the "means test" and
the subordination of the fault issue are concepts which could improve the
rules pertaining to alimony.
Only historical accident can account for the illogical, anachronistic,
and unjust law of alimony as it is administered in most states. 8 We have
seen that the concept of alimony is derived from ecclesiastical law in di-
vorce a mensa et thoro cases as it existed before Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts, when the husband owned or controlled matrimonial property
and a duty to pay alimony to the wife was reciprocal to such status. Ap-
parently, without thinking through the matter, alimony was adopted for
the totally different situation where there was absolute divorce, not mere
judicial separation, and the ex-wife retained the ownership of her sepa-
rate property. No longer s there a reciprocal basis for the duty, and the
only justifiable social and economic purposes for alimony are to keep
former wives off relief or to compensate for the inadequacies of matri-
monial property law. The latter purpose would be better served, as pre-
viously stated, by an adaptation of community property principles and an
approach similar to the dissolution of a partnership.
The assumption in both our welfare law and alimony law that upon
marriage a husband is saddled with a lifelong duty to support a wife or
ex-wife who does not remarry is most questionable in an age when wo-
men have clamored for and achieved equality. Such an assumption makes
women more equal than equal. Even if the husband's obligation is con-
ditioned upon actual need and ability to pay, the assumed obligation is
questionable. It is an incident of status rather than of contract. Even
the economic basis of the assumption is suspect, due to the notorious dif-
ficulties in collecting support and alimony awards. In Lake County, In-
diana, for example, it was reported a few years ago that there were ar-
rearages or no collections in 89 percent of the cases and that in 47 per-
58. See Paulsen, supra note 48.
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cent no support or alimony payments were made even though the court
order directed payment to the clerk of court. 9 Other reports indicate
that there are arrearages in at least 50 percent of support and alimony
cases."0 This unprecedented wholesale defiance of court orders by em-
bittered men may be accounted for, at least in part, by the failure of
courts to be realistic and to appreciate that an automatic imposition of the
support duty is not in accord with current values and in many cases is
highly penal.
In the case of the more prosperous, the husband's duty to support or
pay alimony may be an unpleasant but tolerable burden, but where a poor
or low income husband is involved, even a minimal order may constitute
a great hardship or impossible burden. Of necessity, he may become a
fugitive. Moreover, if he remarries or establishes a new family, further
complications inevitably arise, making his primary obligation to the first
family unrealistic. In short, both support and alimony law occasion hard-
ship to poor and lower income husbands and in application often force
the man into defiance of the law or prevent him from living in dignity.
Either a "means test" should be employed in a realistic fashion, or a new
approach should be made to the problem of separated or divorced fami-
lies. It might be possible to follow the example of unemployment com-
pensation and to devise some form of social security insurance against
family breakdown. Husbands might welcome such a plan; it might be
actuarily sound, and it would be more certain than compliance with sup-
port orders. The objection that such an insurance plan would precipitate
divorce or family breakdown is unrealistic.
It remains to be seen whether tenBroek's constitutional arguments
based upon the equal protection clause will have general application to the
obligations imposed by welfare laws. In the Kirchner case,6 the Cali-
fornia court held that a statute imposing liability for the care and main-
tenance of a mentally ill relative committed to a state institution violated
the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection. More recently,
however, the California court narrowly construed the principle of
IKirclnzer and held that a father was responsible for the support of a mi-
nor in a juvenile correctional institution and must reimburse the state for
his maintenance. 6 The son had been committed by order of the juvenile
59. See Study of Divorce and Support Orders in Lake County, Indiana, 1956-1957,
by Fred H. Steininger, submitted to Lake County Welfare Board (mimeographed).
60. See Foster, Dependent Children and the Law, 18 U. PiTt. L. REv. 579 (1957).
61. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 722, 388 P.2d 724
(1964).
62. County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 685, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966).
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court for assault with intent to murder. Apparently, California is mak-
ing a distinction based upon the dominant purpose of the commitment.
If the "dominant purpose" is to protect the public, a relative may not be
charged with reimbursement, but if it is to reform and rehabilitate "to
the end that he may return to the family," or for that purpose and to pro-
tect the public, an order for reimbursement does not violate California's
equal protection clause.
It is obvious that California's distinction between protection of the
public and benefit to the family is artificial and that the labels employed
are arbitrary. There is a public and social interest in the family and in
the health and behavior of individuals; there is a family and individual
interest in the health and behavior of family members who pose a threat
to the public.6" The policy issue which should be faced, in the legislature
as well as in the courts, is the problem of whether any reimbursement
duties should be imposed under welfare laws. It would seem that the
California distinction as to "dominant purpose" is possibly itself an arbi-
trary classification under equal protection principles. Commitments to
either a mental institution or a correctional facility presumably are for
both public and private benefit, and the determination of disposition to
one or the other may be somewhat fortuitous." In principle, only where
one receives a special benefit should he be singled out for a special con-
tribution. This is the obverse of the rule that in a just society citizens
should be compensated for special loss inflicted by governmental activity
or the exercise of eminent domain.6" It is one thing to shoulder a common
burden; it is another to be singled out and subjected to a disproportionate
and special burden.
The equal protection arguments of Professor tenBroek, and ra-
tionale of the Kirchner case, may not stand up under close analysis. How-
ever, this criticism does not impair the larger thesis that alimony and
support laws are discriminatory in application. Discrimination abounds
under both of the dual systems of family law. The "man in the home"
disqualification under welfare laws,6 especially where it leads to mid-
night raids," is imposed in the name of economy at the expense of pri-
63. See Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 16 (1921), reprinted in HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE 238-46 (1921).
64. See In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
65. See Foster, Tort Liability Under Damage Clauses, 5 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1952).
66. See discussion by Lewis & Levy, supra note 42, at 772-74, 777-80.
67. See Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE
L.J. 1346 (1963) ; tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 667-71. Miller, szpra note 29, at
397, points out "Current mores condone, even honor, the rich taxpayer whose lawyers
and accountants find loopholes in the law that enables him to avoid income tax payments,
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vacy and human dignity. Under the alimony statutes of New York, the
ex-wife may be deprived of alimony only upon proof "that the wife is
habitually living with another man and holding herself out as his wife.""8
If, in the name of economy, or conventional morality, the support obliga-
tion is to be passed to the man in the home and welfare is to be termin-
ated, such should occur only where a de facto family has been established
and the man has means for support. Even then the "man in the home"
policy may occasion more harm than good.
Moreover, it is doubtful that tenBroek is correct when he assumes
that alimony is "less penal" than welfare law. Wherever courts fail to
give priority to actual need and ability to pay and concentrate on the
fault issue, the result is apt to be an alimony award that in effect is an
amercement, comparable to a criminal fine, but without benefit of a
jury trial. 9
Effective criticism of welfare laws and their administration should
be directed at their basic philosophy and at bureaucratic rules and regula-
tions. The philosophy should be that public assistance for the poor and
handicapped is a public responsibility. As in the case of alimony, actual
need and ability to pay should be the primary considerations, and punitive
features should be eliminated. But in the case of welfare, it is the ability
of the state to pay that is relevant. The destitute should be regarded as
having a just claim for, if not a legal right to, assistance, and welfare
administrators should be further oriented to think in terms of help and
service rather than paring relief rolls. If the recipients of assistance are
"clients," welfare officials should regard them as such rather than as
panhandlers. Effective legal representation for welfare recipients and
repercussions from the poverty program may bring about a change in
emphasis in both underlying philosophy and administration.
CHILD CUSTODY AND POVERTY
Custody disputes are rarely litigated among the poor and when they
do arise they usually occur otherwise than as an incident to divorce. Of
course, with increased free legal services to the poor, it may be anticipated
that there will be an increase in such litigation. At the present time,
however, a non-judicial issue over custody is more apt to arise as an
incident in the administration of the AFDC program.
For example, welfare regulations may require that before AFDC
but the welfare recipient who finds a loophole that enables her to increase aid to her
children is an object of public wrath."
68. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 248.
69. See Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of Alimony, 6 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRO B. 283 (1939).
209
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
may be awarded, the case worker must decide whether a bona fide offer
of a free home made by a parent, relative, or other person should be con-
sidered a "resource." 7  A mother who has become destitute may be de-
nied AFDC because of the availability of other resources. Such denials
may be a lever to force the mother to give custody to the father or some
other relative. Obviously, the child's best interests should be the con-
trolling principle, and the grant or withdrawal of AFDC funds should
not be utilized to control custody or to force a mother to give up her
children. Nor should withdrawal of assistance funds be used as leverage
to force marital reconciliations.
The actual custody of children also is affected in some states by a
one-year residency requirement for granting public assistance. This re-
quirement is an inhospitable survivor of the Elizabethan Poor Law's
"settlement" principle. The migration of the mother may be inhibited
and she may be deterred from moving to a better labor market, or she
may have to place her children with someone else if she moves, because
AFDC will be unavailable at the new location."' Both the "free home"
and residency limitations reflect the economizing or "minimizing the
cost" orientation of our welfare laws and in operation lend themselves
to prejudiced application.
It should be noted, however, that the AFDC program, designed to
permit children to be cared for in the home, is a tremendous improvement
over the situation which prevailed when poor children were placed in
orphanages. Under AFDC the mother may be able to maintain the
household, although to some extent her parental control is subject to the
guidance of social workers who may intervene and give advice or pass
judgment upon household management, child rearing, and budget mat-
ters.72 Such intervention may be a welcome service or busybody snoop-
ing, depending upon the circumstances.
In a few custody cases poverty may be a factor in determining place-
ment. To some extent it is tied in with such proper criteria as the
wholesomeness of the home environment and other factors pertaining to
the child's welfare. For example, in a recent North Carolina case the
custody of a child was transferred from the mother to the father where
it was shown that the mother lived in a trailer, worked long hours as a
waitress, and earned only $17.96 a week.7" The father lived with his
parents in a large house where the child would have her own room. In
70. Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 717, 727
(1966).
71. Id. at 732.
72. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 649.
73. Matter of Teresa Ann Bowman, 142 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. 1965).
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another recent case,74 the court refused to change custody from the father
where he maintained a good home and the mother, who had remarried,
worked from late afternoon until midnight. The California court in
Harris v. Harris75 changed custody from the mother to the father, who
was a doctor with a good income, where it was shown that the children
were neglected, dressed poorly, and lived in a house without toilet facili-
ties, and that the mother when drunk lay around the house nude, and
sometimes stayed out all night with men. A Pennsylvania mother, who
lived in a trailer camp, also lost the custody of her six-year-old daughter
to the father where it was shown that she neglected the child and fre-
quently took her to bars."8
There is a danger in such cases that the decision of what is or is not
a suitable home or parent may be determined by middle class values, and
that a social worker's report or court decision may reflect class prejudices.
Those who place cleanliness next to godliness may be entitled to their
preference but undue self-righteousness may lead to such extreme state-
ments as those contained in the Iowa court's opinion in Painter v. Ban-
nister." To the extent that poverty accounts for the negative factors in
the home, it should be taken into account in evaluating suitability and fit-
ness. Deliberate neglect or abuse is one thing, incidents of poverty are
another.
SOCIAL CLASS AND ADOPTION
Class and race distinctions have a profound effect upon placement
and adoption. There is a constant demand for, and a relatively short
supply of, white children born to middle class mothers. There also may
be a lesser market for the children of poor white mothers. In the case
of non-white poverty groups, however, there is virtually no demand.'
Mothers from the latter class often are not permitted to relinquish their
children to agencies for adoption because of the practical impossibility of
locating adoptive homes. About 90 percent of adopted children are white
although 60 percent of all illegitimate children are non-white. Probably
no more than 500 to 1,000 families in the United States have taken
multiracial children for adoption.71
74. Croce v. Cummings, 179 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1965).
75. 186 Cal. App. 2d 788, 9 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
76. Commonwealth v. Sabo, 198 Pa. Super. 161, 181 A.2d 921 (1962).
77. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). Professor tenBroek contends that the presump-
tion of parental fitness applies mainly to members of the middle classes, but is substan-
tially relaxed as to the poor. In cases involving the poor, "parental fitness" is examined
rather than presumed. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 676. See also Katz, Foster
Parents Versus Agencies, 65 MICH. L. REv. 145, 158 (1966).
78. See Kay & Philips, supra note 70, at 738.
79. Time, January 27, 1967. p. 76.
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In addition to the discriminatory effect of current demand, the rules
for matching the adopted child to the adopting parents may have the same
effect, whether intended or not. The attempt to match ethnic background,
religion, physical characteristics, intelligence, and the like restricts the
opportunity for placement and the opportunity to adopt. Probably, in
most states welfare agencies would not place a Negro child in a white
home, or a white child in a Negro home, regardless of the wishes of the
parties or the suitability of the home.8" Due to the lobbying of religious
groups, "where practicable" there must be a matching of religion. The
dogma appears to be that there is a covenant running with the child to
the faith.8' Hopefully, such irreligious nonsense may eventually be held
to violate the first amendment.
If we apply Cahn's "consumer's perspective" and direct our attention
to the needs of children and the commendable desires of adoptive parents,
and reject as irrelevant class, race, and religious prejudices, the best in-
terests of children and parents will be served. There is a need for critical
judicial and legislative re-evaluation of the criteria applied in adoption
and custody placements to discern which rules are reasonable or unreason-
able in a democratic society. It is not surprising that the press and the
public became angry over Commissioner Fitzsimmon's initial refusal to
permit the adoption of four-year-old, blonde Beth Liuni by forty-eight-
year-old, dark complexioned parents.82 The irrelevancy of coloration in
that case was obvious when compared with their shared mutual love and
affection. The point is, however, race and religion, under the same cir-
cumstances, would be just as irrelevant. Due process and equal protec-
tion concepts should be applied to child placement. It is a violation of
religious freedom, or the establishment of religion, to bar an adoption
solely because of differences in religion. It is a denial of equal protec-
80. See Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEO. L.J.
64, 75-77 (1962), and for an enlightened decision, see In re Adoption of a Minor, 228
F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The Standards for Adoption promulgated by the Childhood
Welfare League of America state that racial background in itself should not be a major
criterion in the selection of a home for a child.
81. See Katz, supra note 80, at 70-75. See also Ramsey, Legal Imputation of Re-
ligion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 649 (1959). Compare
Matter of Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1958),
with Petition of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
942 (1955).
82. See Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51 Misc. 2d 96 (Family Ct., Ulster County 1966),
rev'd, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Div. 1966). The January 17, 1967, issue of The New
York Times reported that Commissioner Fitzsimmons reluctantly signed the necessary
papers so that Beth might be adopted by the Liuni family with whom she has lived for
four and a half years, having been placed in that home when she was five days old.
Commissioner Fitzsimmons had opposed the adoption as an "improper placement" be-
cause of the difference in color of Beth and the Liunis, the age (48) of the adopting
parents, and Mrs. Liuni's prior hospitalization for emotional or mental illness.
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tion to discriminate by arbitrary classification so that Negro children
cannot be placed in white homes that welcome them.
So far we have been looking at the function of the agency and the
courts' function in adoption cases and the discrimination that may be
built into the law or rules and regulations. It also is of interest that the
institution of adoption may mean different things in different social
classes. Professor Jeffery, a distinguished sociologist, has pointed out
that the adoptive parents from the upper class usually are childless and
unrelated to the out-of-wedlock children they adopt, and that the adop-
tion is for the purpose of acquiring a child for the family, i.e., to create
a new social and familial relationship where one did not previously ex-
ist.8" The middle class, however, usually adopts from the "divorce" and
"parent" rather than the "out-of-wedlock" category, and typically the
natural mother after divorce remarries and the second husband adopts the
child. The social function is to legalize an existing social relationship.
Lower class adoptions usually are from the "other" and "family" cate-
gories; the typical case is one where the children are in the care of rela-
tives. The purpose may be to qualify for relief benefits, and the social
function may be to provide a type of social service for dependent and
neglected children.
According to this study, in their operation adoption laws tend to
accord a service to middle and upper class families. Unwed middle and
upper class mathers have a seller's market for their illegitimate offspring.
The children of the poor and minority groups do not enjoy similar ad-
vantages. The consequences of illegitimacy are alleviated for some, but
not for others. The unwanted child of a college co-ed may readily find
a good home, but the chances are that the child of a domestic must be ab-
sorbed into a family which already has too many mouths to feed. Of
course, in human terms, the latter home may be better because of warmth
and affection, but it also may be an environment which spawns despera-
tion and delinquency. We do not begrudge any children their oppor-
tunity to acquire adoptive parents; we merely lament the fact that the op-
portunity is not open to all and that arbitrary or discriminatory barriers
all too often have been raised to prevent the placement of children in
good homes.8 4
83. See Jeffery, Social Class and Adoption Petitioners, 9 SoCIAL PROBLEMS 354
(1962).
84. For a devastating critique of a bureaucratic approach to placement and adop-
tion, see Katz, supra note 77, commenting upon In re Jewish Child Care Association, 5
N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1959).
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POVERTY, DELINQUENCY, DEPENDENCY, AND NEGLECT
Within the past decade we have become increasingly aware of the
shortcomings of the juvenile court system and the need for a re-examina-
tion of its operation and its basic premises.85 The slogans of parens
patriae and "treatment not punishment"8 are no longer taken at face
value. The sociological facade of some of these courts is being pene-
trated and old fashioned lawyers' notions of due process are being raised
in juvenile cases. The former isolation from the mainstream of judicial
theory and values is a thing of the past, and we may be sure that the equi-
librium of intake and case workers is being shaken if not toppled. Pro-
fessor Monrad Paulsen has summarized the ferment and change in ju-
venile court procedures as follows:
Today there is really no doubt that the Constitution requires
'due process of law' to be observed in juvenile courts...
The 'due process' idea is making headway with legislatures as
well as with courts. In California a right to counsel was ex-
pressly written into the law in 1960. In New York, in 1961, a
system of law guardians was created. . . . Juvenile respond-
ents in each case in New York are now told by legislative order
that they have a right to counsel, a right to remain silent and a
right to a state-paid lawyer if they have no money to hire one.8"
At this writing, the Supreme Court has not handed down its deci-
sion in Matter of Gault.88  It is expected that at a minimum the Court
will hold that all relevant due process principles apply to juvenile court
proceedings and that at a maximum it will hold where commitment to an
institution may be the disposition juveniles are entitled to all of the rights
that pertain in criminal court procedure.
85. See Paulsen, Jievenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L.
RFv. 694 (1966). A juvenile court judge has pointed out that "The real dilemma con-
cerns not the philosophy of the juvenile court, but whether the composite results of its
performance justify continued reliance upon the parens patriae theory. . . . If the court
interferes unjustifiably in the private lives of juveniles and their families, makes de-
terminations which it lacks the facilities to implement effectively and imposes sanctions
without techniques capable of producing effective rehabilitation, then nothing is lost by
subjecting youthful offenders to the criminal process." Polow, The Juvenile Court:
Effective Justice or Benevolent Despotism?, 53 A.B.A.J. 31, 33 (1967).
86. For a comment on the history of parens patriae, see Note, The Parens Patriae
Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U.
PITT L. REV. 894 (1966).
87. Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Law, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 597, 608-09
(1965).
88. 99 Ariz. 180, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. jiurs, noted 384 U.S. 997 (1966). See
also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), where Mr. Justice Fortas questioned
the premises of the parens patriae theory and intimated that due process might require a
right to counsel in juvenile courts, as did the applicable statute.
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The procedure and working of the juvenile court and juvenile
authorities have special relevancy when we examine their clientele. It is
notorious that in the past, and prior to the recent "epidemic" of suburban
delinquency, social class was a major factor in determining which delin-
quents were taken to the police station or detention center, processed
through the juvenile court, and placed on probation or sent off to insti-
tutions. One result of this differentiated selectivity in processing youth-
ful offenders through the juvenile court was the erroneous conclusion
that delinquency was almost exclusively a slum problem. As late as 1964,
it was reported that delinquency, as seen from juvenile court date, was
concentrated in urban areas in certain sections where there was a high
percentage of economically deprived breadwinners, poorly assimilated
in-migrants, poor housing, and broken homes.89 More recently, however,
there have been discussions about "hidden delinquency" which does not
appear on the police blotter or in juvenile court records. A 1965 series
on delinquency in suburbia reports:
All suburban statistics are clouded to some extent by the ques-
tion of "hidden delinquency"-offenses committed by middle
and upper class children that never find their way onto police
blotters, court calendars, or even juvenile and bureau files.
Cover-up on these cases is usually associated with village or pri-
vate police forces, whose members are likely to know the of-
fending youth or his parents, or whose officials are more con-
cerned with community image than with accurate records.90
89. Perlman, Antisocial Behavior of the Minor inL the United States, 28 FED. PROB.
23, 27-28 (1964). For a comparison of middle and upper class delinquents with lower
class delinquents, see Shanley, Lefever, & Rice, The Aggressive Middle-Class Delinquent
57 J. C:m. L., C. & P. S. 145 (1966). It was found that law violation patterns of these
groups were comparable in terms of both frequency and seriousness.
90. Abrams, Crime in Suburbia, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 48. It is reported that
"From Long Island to Los Angeles, the suburbs-traditionally regarded as bastions of
respectability-produced in 1964 the fastest rising rate of crime in the Nation. And in
the first half of 1965, when crime in the Nation's urban areas leveled off, suburban of-
fenses continued to mount at an unprecedented pace, although they still remain well
below urban rates. . . . Nassau police statistics indicate . . . that the per capita crime
rate for youths under 21 also has jumped up sharply. The figures show that out of
every 100,000 Nassau youths, 315 were arrested in 1960; in 1964, that number had in-
creased to 489-a rise of 55 per cent. . . . Youths between 13 and 21 accounted for
most of Long Island's 10,000 burglaries and 3,600 auto thefts . . . reported last year,
according to police. They are responsible for more than 40 per cent of all Long Island
crime . . . although they comprise less than 20 per cent of the total population. Sur-
veys . . . indicate that most of these offenders are white collar youths who come from
comfortable private homes where the income is good and the family is both small and
intact." See also Hechinger, Affluent Delinqiency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1963, p. 25,
cols. 5-6; Lelyveld, The Paradoxical Case of the Affluent Delinquent, N.Y. Times Sun-
day Magazine section, Oct. 4, 1964.
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Undoubtedly, police and juvenile court records do give a false im-
pression with reference to the incidence of youthful offenses among the
middle and upper classes. Juvenile court cases represent the top of the
iceberg of the delinquency problem. On the other hand, it also is true
that "the tendency among law-enforcement personnel, in the main, is to
overlook much more in poorer neighborhoods than in those which are
better off. In the poorer neighborhoods police are inundated by so much
antisocial activity that they tend to take cognizance only of that which is
most pressing."91  In other words, in both slum and suburban areas po-
lice officers have been selective in the cases processed, in the urban area
because antisocial behavior is so rampant, an in the suburban area because
in better neighborhoods it has been the custom to informally resolve all
but the most serious cases by contacting parents.92 Depending upon
many variables, police failure to process serious juvenile misbehavior
through the juvenile court may have harmful consequences for the public
or the juvenile.
There also is the problem of how "delinquency" is defined by statute
and construed by officers and courts. Quite obviously, terms such as
"persons in need of supervision," "incorrigible," "out of control," and
"habitually truant," permit considerable leeway in application. In one
sense, such statutory vagueness is necessary, for the implications of com-
parable behavior may differ between both individuals and neighborhoods.
On the other hand, individualization of treatment carries with it the
seeds of resentment. Underprivileged youths in the slums who face ar-
rest and reform school for an offense that is overlooked or results in pro-
bation for a middle or upper class boy, may have understandable embit-
terment and resentment.9" It is difficult to strike a judicious balance be-
tween even justice and appropriate individualized disposition. It also is
true that most law-abiding adults in their youth committed offenses, and
that what we recall as boyish scrapes or "letting off steam" falls squarely
within the vague definition of delinquency.
A 1963 comparison of unreported juvenile offenses admitted on a
questionnaire by a group of college students and reported offenses for
91. Chwast, Alienation as a Factor in Delinquency, 28 FED. PROB. 25 (1964).
92. See Note, Jmenile Delinquency: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARy. L. REv. 775 (1966).
93. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 696-97, also points out that emphasis on treatment
rather than punishment may be puzzling or seem foolish to juveniles who expect swift
retribution, and that juveniles may resent being treated as children. Parents may resent
a probation officer taking over the functions of parenthood. Paulsen, id. at 699, con-
cludes that "a child of parents who are very poor stands in danger of a court-ordered
separation from his parents to an extent which children of middle and upper classes do




which 2,049 children were being charged in the Juvenile Court at Fort
Worth, disclosed that the unreported offenses were as serious in nature
as those for which the Fort Wayne children were being charged. 4 The
author concluded that there is a differential selection of juvenile of-
fenders on the basis of the social importance of the child's family. A
good family was identified as one in which parents held positions of re-
sponsibility, and 54 percent of the police officers interviewed reported
that they would not report to the juvenile court a child coming from such
a home. The failure to report such cases was justified by the officers on
the grounds that experience indicated "boys from good families straighten
out in a couple of years and become respectable citizens," and that there
was no need to embarrass a good family when the parents were co-
operative.
Although in the past it might have been true that juvenile offenders
from "good homes" often by-passed the juvenile court process, and that
the cop on the beat in a ghetto area overlooked trivial offenses, the in-
creased concern over the depredations of youthful offenders is bound to
reduce the "differential selection" referred to above.95 Parental promises
to send teenagers off to boarding school or to a psychiatrist no longer
seem adequate in communities where juveniles are responsible for a sub-
stantial proportion of local crime.96 Presumably, more teenagers from
well-off families will be sent to correctional institutions.
Insofar as the disposition of cases is concerned, probably any close
look at those cases that result in incarceration, probation, or dismissal
will reveal a pattern of economic and social differentiation. Although it
is desirable to take home environment into account, there is danger that
conscious or unconscious bias may influence evaluation and disposition.
Juvenile delinquency laws are peculiarly vulnerable to abuse and mis-
application because of vague statutory terminology and the informality
of procedures.9" Participants in civil rights or other protest demonstra-
tions may be railroaded as delinquents under the broad discretion com-
mitted to juvenile courts. This danger is so extreme that it may be ar-
94. See Goldman, The Differentiated Selection of Juvenile Offenders for Court
Appearances (1950) (unpublished thesis in Sociology Dep't, University of Chicago), in
turn citing the study by Porterfield.
95. See Note, Juvenile Delinquent: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, supra note 92.
96. See note 83 supra.
97. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEIENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 80-83 (1965): juveniles arrested for civil rights demonstra-
tions in Jackson, Mississippi, Americus, Georgia, and St. Augustine, Florida, "were
threatened with imprisonment and, as a condition of exoneration or release, were forced
to promise that they would not participate in future civil rights activities." See also
Paulsen, stpra note 85, at 707-08.
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gued that limitations must be placed on juvenile court discretion by leg-
islatures or appellate courts or we may find we have created another
Star Chamber.
De facto segregation also is prevalent in juvenile institutions. Judge
Justine Wise Polier has pointed out that Negro and Puerto Rican delin-
quents from New York City fill the state-operated institutions while
white delinquents usually end up at private or church-operated institu-
tions.98 Such segregation, although accidental or fortuitous, may well
reinforce antisocial attitudes.99
The conclusion is inescapable that poverty, race, and social class en-
ter into each stage of the processing of juvenile offenses. The police of-
ficer and desk sergeant, who without court referral handle 60 to 70 per-
cent of all juvenile cases,"'0 have a broad discretion. The intake depart-
ment of the juvenile court has a similar discretion, and the juvenile court
judge has virtually unlimited authority to dispose of cases as he sees fit.
Although broad discretions also exist in the criminal process applicable
to adults, there are fewer precedents, standards, and guidelines for ju-
venile cases. In the juvenile courts in some metropolitan areas delin-
quency cases are heard and disposed of at the rate of thirty an hour be-
fore a single judge.' The most practicable safeguard against abuse of
discretion may be the formulation and application of standards for pro-
cessing at each stage, and the use of law guardians to represent juveniles.
This may reduce but not eliminate the danger of discriminatory differen-
tial treatment based upon poverty, race, or social class.
Dependency and neglect cases in the juvenile courts also reveal the
relationship between poverty and juvenile court jurisdiction. Professor
Herma Kay gives the following breakdown for Alameda County, Cali-
fornia: of 2,356 referrals for neglected and dependent children in 1964,
there were 952 referrals for unfit home situations; 601 referrals due to
lack of parental control and supervision; 365 referrals because of no
parent or guardian; 303 referrals because a parent was ill or incapaci-
tated; 65 referrals where the child was a victim of rape or molestation;
49 protective referrals; 20 referrals where the child was unhappy with
the home situation; and 10 referrals where there were suicide attempts.0 2
Economic deprivation is the common thread running through most of
98. POLIER, A VIEW FROM THE BENCH 26 (1964).
99. Voorhees, supra note 6, at 24, says "Above all, there is bitterness, deep-seated
and bordering on hatred, against the whole apparatus of the law. The policeman ('the
Man'), the police court, the magistrate, the constable and the process server are the
enemy. They are thought of as oppressors or the servants of oppressors."
100. See note 95 szra.
101. Voorhees, supra note 6, at 25 n.11.
102. See Kay & Philips, supra note 70, at 735.
UNEQUAL PROTECTION
the above categories, although as we have seen, it should not be assumed
that delinquency, dependency, and neglect are the exclusive lot of the poor.
The most egregious example of parental neglect is the so-called
"battered child syndrome."'03  The evaluation and case studies of this
phenomenon by Elizabeth Elmer show that the prototype of child abusers
is a poor, young, white, Protestant mother on relief, who is mentally ill
or retarded, alienated from social groups, has had several children too
close together, usually illegitimately and has been confronted with mul-
tiple crises.""4 To date the "battered child" statutes, which since 1960
have been passed in all but one or two American jurisdictions, tend to
concentrate on requirements for reporting suspected cases to police au-
thorities, and usually are limited to physical abuse. A few of those
statutes recognize the need for social services for such families rather
than a strictly penal approach," 5 and in a few instances "neglect" as well
as physical abuse must be reported by those subject to the obligation to
report.' Presumably, "neglect" may include psychic as well as physical
abuse. In theory this should be so but there is danger that a Pandora's
Box might be opened to cranks or those who have preconceived notions
on child rearing. In any event, what has been called the "Beverly Hills
syndrome,"' 7 i.e., child neglect in better neighborhoods, is related to the
overall problem of mores and antisocial behavior in suburbia.
In practice, it may be somewhat arbitrary to classify a particular
family problem as one of "delinquency," "dependency," or "neglect."
Moreover, the juvenile's problem may be but one facet of a larger family,
neighborhood, or community problem. The classification made, how-
ever, may determine disposition and consequences. It is tragic that all too
often a particular court looks at and treats only one segment of a larger
problem and hence nothing meaningful is accomplished. Fragmented
jurisdiction over family problems inevitably leads to partial or inadequate
solutions.' It is doubtful that urban social problems can be substan-
103. See Foster & Freed, The Battered Child, 3 TRIAL 33 (1967) ; McCoid, Battered
Children, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1965); Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, Child Abuse Re-
porting Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 G.W.L. REv. 482 (1966).
104. Elmer, Identification of Abused Children, CHILDREN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE BULL. (1965).
105. See Foster & Freed, supra note 103, at 36. Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey,
and North Dakota statutes specifically refer to the use of social agencies in child abuse
cases.
106. See Foster & Freed, Battered Child Legislation and Professional Immiunity, 52
A.B.A.J. 1071, 1073 (1966).
107. See The Beverly Hills Syndrome, unpublished proceedings of the Conference
on Probation and the Law sponsored by the California Department of Health and Wel-
fare, San Francisco, April, 1963, cited by Kay & Philips, supra note 70, at 739.
108. See GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY
dh. 15 (1954).
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tially alleviated until all levels of government and interested agencies unite
in a concerted attack upon poverty, ignorance, crime, and disease. At
the present time there is little coordination of effort; various agencies
concentrate on facets and remain oblivious to the larger dimensions of
chronic problems.
CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made to sketch some of the areas of family
law where a different law applies to the poor or disadvantaged. To the
extent that there are meaningful differences calling for different treat-
ment or disposition, distinctions are not invidious. It is where discrim-
inatory consequences are visited upon the poor because they are poor that
our democratic commitments are violated. Moreover, we may not in
good conscience object to self-help where the law is structured so that
only the well-to-do can afford to resort to it.
Only a total war on poverty, in lieu of the present guerrilla warfare,
has a chance for substantial success. In the meantime, however, it may
be wise to improvise and improve the situation at the most acute pressure
points. One of the most important of these is our administration of wel-
fare legislation and family law. We can reduce or eliminate some injus-
tice and better effectuate our moral pretensions and avowed public policy.
A good example of a needed reform, which is within the realm of
the possible, is the inclusion of de facto or "common law" families under
the benefits conferred by workmen's compensation, social security, and
similar statutes providing for dependents. Illegitimate children and de
facto wives usually are excluded from many or most of the benefits
given dependents under state or federal law.1"9 In the case of children,
it is difficult to show social justification for the dichotomy between le-
gitimate and illegitimate, and it may be primarily a vestige of that status
which Blackstone called "filius nullius" or an expression of Victorian
morality. The harsh consequence is that the innocent victims of parental
sin, unfortunate circumstances, or unrealistic divorce laws are penalized.
It is absurd to assume as some moralists do that the stigma of illegitimacy
will deter illicit propagation.
There is a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the stability of
some irregular family relationships. Many unmarried couples maintain
109. See Comment, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 337 (1962). Miller, supra note 29, at 404, claims "my own preliminary studies
on the basis of census data indicate that the illegitimate birth rate varies little as between
racial groups within the same income range. There is every probability that the same
thing is true as respects juvenile delinquency and crime rates."
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a stable family relationship for a long period of time. tenBroek's study
quotes a California Welfare Department report as stating,
The duration of these [informal] alliances is surprisingly long
in view of the number of strikes against them. The statistics
on such families known to AFDC shows that 16% have been
together eight or more years, nearly 30% more than five years,
and almost half . . . at least three years.11
At least where there is a stable relationship and actual dependence
upon the breadwinner, the family and society would be better off if legal
recognition were given to the family unit. Such recognition could be ac-
corded in several ways. The presumption that a valid marriage in fact
occurred could protect the dependents and would be difficult to rebut."'
Unless statutory language forbids, "dependent" could be construed to in-
clude putative families. The Tennessee court, reasoning from a ques-
tionable analogy, held that imposition of the duty to support an illegiti-
mate child was evidence of a public policy that an illegitimate child was a
"dependent" under the workmen's compensation act."' In most in-
stances, however, courts, without sufficient regard to practical conse-
quences, have been legalistic rather than humane and have held that a
natural child or non-wife are not "dependents" under the law."3
The punishment of innocent children for parental sin found its most
vicious expression under the "suitable home" test incident to Title IV of
the Social Security Act. Some twenty-five states passed "suitable home"
provisions in setting up local standards for public assistance." 4  Under
these provisions a home could be declared "unsuitable" for a variety of
reasons, including the conduct of a parent or guardian. As part of its
campaign against the civil rights movement and desegregation, Louisiana
in 1960 amended its law to deny all benefits to any child living with its
mother if she had an illegitimate child after having received assistance, or
to any illegitimate child whose mother had had two previous illegitimate
children."' All aid would be denied solely because of the mother's pre-
110. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 7, at 617 n.751.
111. See Note, The Conflict of Presumptions on Successive Marriages by the Same
Person, 30 HARv. L. REv. 500 (1917), reprinted in SELECrED ESSAYS oN FAmILY LAW
287 (1950). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 464 (1925).
112. Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 340 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1960), noted 29
TFNN. L. REv. 600 (1962).
113. For example, see Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co., 95 So. 2d 872 (La.
App. 1957). In Kentucky, however, common law marriages are specifically recognized
by statute for workmen's compensation but not other cases. See Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275
Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137 (1938).
114. See Comment, "Suitable Home" Tests Under Social Security: A Functional
Approach to Equal Protection, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1193 (1961).
115. Id. at 1193, citing and discussing LA. Pv. STAT. ANN. § 46:233 (Supp. 1960).
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vious conduct.
In 1961, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare issued a
directive withholding federal funds from states imposing such arbitrary
eligibility requirements on recipients of social security benefits."' He
decided that state plans which deny assistance to a child on the basis of
the suitability of its home without removing the child from that home
would no longer qualify for federal assistance. Seven states, including
Louisiana, had such plans. The decision was based on the ground that
such plans impose "a condition of eligibility that bears no just relation-
ship to the Aid to Dependent Children program." It was not contended
that states could not pursue their own interests in economy and in the
regulation of morality, but it was held that the federal purpose could not
be directly contravened by excluding a considerable segment of the class
intended to be favored, while leaving them in "unsuitable" homes. In
addition to the rationale of the Secretary, the Louisiana statute posed
constitutional problems under the due process and equal protection
clauses."7
It will be difficult if not impossible to provide opportunity and re-
habilitation for the poor or disadvantaged until we eradicate the punitive
and almsgiving philosophy of some politicians. The premise should be
that there is a public responsibility to alleviate suffering and misery, and
that each citizen has a right to human dignity, assistance, and opportunity
to improve his lot. Welfare workers should strive for the image of
counselor and helper and truly treat their clientele as "clients." In fact,
we may need a new profession, or a new orientation of the present pro-
fession, including law and social work, to safeguard and protect the legal
and moral rights of citizens who happen to be poor."' We need to think
more about the rights of citizens and the duties of government, and the
responsibilities of both. Philosophically, it is time to abandon the idea
that poverty is deserved and the Puritan notion that idleness and de-
pravity are self-inflicted or incurred as a divine punishment.
In order to create a new profession or to re-orient existing profes-
sions to protect the citizens and to help him secure his just rights against
the welfare state, we must teach to students of law and social work the
rule of law and its application to judicial, administrative, and bureau-
116. Id. at 1194. It also should be noted that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, d-1 (1964), forbids any discrimination in feder-
ally assisted programs and empowers various federal agencies to adopt guidelines pre-
scribing the method of enforcement. Under the guidelines of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, states are required to file statements of compliance describing
an area of discrimination and steps taken to correct it.
117. Id. at 1195.
118. See Foster, The Law and Social Work, 53 Ky. L.J. 229 (1965).
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cratic procedures.119 Our courts are beginning to take cognizance of
revolutionary changes and the emerging concept of public responsibility.
Gideon '."2 trumpet is being heard in various kinds of proceedings;
Griswold's'2' right of privacy is being extended beyond the bedroom; and
the sanctity of contracts is becoming less sacred where unconscionable
terms are imposed upon installment buyers.'22
There is hope; there is movement; and in the space age, when men
reach for the stars, it is not too much to expect that we can eliminate
some of the more obvious discriminations visited by law upon the poor.
Long ago an English judge observed that "necessitous men are not free
men." If the War on Poverty and the role of spokesmanship for the free
world are to be more than clich6s, necessity must beget invention. We
must invent and adapt techniques, means, and controls so that freedom
from discrimination is not the exclusive prerogative of a fortunate few,
but is extended to any and all who share in the adventure of living in the
modem world. For that difficult task lawyers are best equipped to give
effective representation at all levels of government, and concepts of due
process will provide the guiding principles. The poor more surely will
gain fair treatment as citizens when counsel is provided not only for in-
digent defendants in criminal cases but also for civil cases, juvenile
court proceedings, commitment hearings, and governmental agency pro-
ceedings. We conclude with a statement from former Attorney General
Katzenbach who summarized our thoughts when he said:
We are coming to recognize that the legal assistance we have
given some poor men has been only a beginning. . . . [W]e
are coming to recognize how fundamental is the role of law in
providing every man membership-and not merely existence-
in our society. . . . The scales are now tipped against the
poor. . . . The solution is not charity, but justice. 2
119. Ibid. See also Symposium: Law of the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 319 (1966),
which contains much valuable material on the administration of welfare laws. See also
The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 361 (1963).
120. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
121. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a provocative discussion
of Supreme Court doctrine, see Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Contitution, 54
CALiF. L. REv. 407 (1966), where current doctrine is traced back to Edwards v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
122. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, and N.Y.U. WELFARE LAW BULL.
No. 2, at 7 (1966).
123. Address by then Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to the National
Conference on Law and Poverty, Washington, D. C., June 24, 1965, pp. 1, 4.
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